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BOOK REVIEW
BLENDING STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Edward Brunett
The addition of a new casebook to a field of law already
crowded with quality competitors is rarely noteworthy. The recent
emergence of Bonfield and Asimow's State and Federal Administrative
Law is an exception to this generalization. The authors crafted a
casebook that emphasizes state administrative law. By doing this,
Bonfield and Asimow offer information that will be immensely valu-
able to the lawyer who is more likely to encounter issues of state,
rather than federal administrative law. Moreover, State and Federal
Administrative Law appropriately emphasizes regulation by rulemak-
ing and de-emphasizes judicial review. Because adjudication is a
comparatively costly mode of regulation,' agencies have renewed
their interest in, and use of, rulemaking. Although the authors pres-
ent some material that makes this book demanding to use as a teach-
ing tool,2 State and Federal Administrative Law is a welcome addition to
the existing, distinguished group of administrative law books.
I
DE-EMPHASIZING FEDERAL ADMINIsTRATivE LAW By
COVERING STATE LAW
By including substantial state materials, State and Federal Admin-
istrative Law departs from the dominance of federal law coverage in
administrative law casebooks. Lawyers and scholars familiar with
t Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. B.A., Northwestern University;
J.D., University of Illinois; LL.M., University of Virginia.
I See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive
Law, 72 VA. L. REv. 253, 254-60 (1986) (emphasizing efficiency of a rulemaking which
can cover a broad scope of related issues); William F. Pederson, Jr., Formal Records and
Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE LJ. 38 (1975) ("Administrative law ... has entered an age
of rulemaking .... as the burden of existing responsibilities has increased.") (footnote
omitted); Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 S. CT. REV. 345, 376 (1979) (noting "the constant and accelerating flight away
from individualized, adjudicatory proceedings to generalized disposition through
rulemaking.") (footnote omitted). Compare RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., Two Problems in Adminis-
trative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit andJndicial Deterrence of Agency
Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300 (1988) (positing that agency costs of rulemaking have
increased because of the demanding and unpredictable attitude of circuit courts gener-
ally and the D.C. Circuit particularly).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 23-24 & 61-80.
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Arthur Bonfield's work should expect this book to focus on state
administrative law. Professor Bonfield's prior scholarship has
stressed the need for law schools to devote more attention to state
administrative law,3 and has focused on optimal schemes of state
administrative procedure. 4
In their casebook's preface, Bonfield and Asimow explicitlyjus-
tiff] their state law focus. They note that "a comparative state-fed-
eral approach to the study of [administrative law] suggests problems
or solutions to problems in the administrative process that are not
otherwise apparent." 5 They also reason that the emphasis on state
administrative law creates a "dear professional advantage" because
"most law students will deal with state administrative agencies in
their practice more frequently than with federal agencies. ' 6 The lat-
ter justification mirrors Bonfield's earlier assertion that "most law-
yers in this country .... spend as much or more time dealing with
state administrative processes as they do with the federal process." '7
Bonfield and Asimow deliver on their promise to cover state as
well as federal administrative law. Their book devotes substantial
attention to state administrative law developments and doctrine.
The authors present state law cases and the 1981 Model Administra-
tive Procedure Act throughout the book. The authors use the 1981
Model State Administrative Procedure Act, reprinted in Appendix
B, often refer to it in notes, and together with the Federal Adminis-
trative Procedure Act ("APA"), 8 it is the basis for the problems ex-
amined in the book. In addition, state law theories and
developments are discussed in the notes following principal cases.
The authors' emphasis on state materials will give readers a
sense of the differences between state and federal administrative
3 Arthur E. Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching ofAdministrative Law: A CriticalAnalysis
of the Status Quo, 61 TEx. L. REV. 95 (1982) (criticizing administrative law teachers for
overemphasizing federal administrative law while neglecting state administrative law,
and asserting that those teachers usually treat state law "as if it were unimportant, re-
dundant, irrelevant or uninformative.").
4 E.g., ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW RULE MAKING (1986); Ar-
thur E. Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297 (1986);
Arthur E. Bonfield, Rulemaking Under the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act: An
Opportunity Well Used, 35 ADMIN. L. REV. 77 (1983); Arthur E. Bonfield, The Definition of
Formal Agency Adjudication Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 63 IowA L. REV. 285
(1977); Arthur E. Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act: Background, Construction,
Applicability, Public Access to Agency Law, The Rulemaking Process, 60 IowA L. REV. 731
(1975).
5 ARTHUR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL AsIMoW, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW xxiii (1989).
6 Id.
7 Bonfield, supra note 3, at 100.
8 Codified at 5 .U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372,
7521 (1988). The Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is contained in Appen-
dix A of the book.
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law. Yet, the authors do not include state materials at the expense
of ignoring federal administrative law. In fact, their casebook con-
tains more federal than state law. Specifically, the book contains
seventy-three principal cases-fifty-three of which are federal cases,
the remaining twenty are state cases. Thus the authors prudently
temper their state law passion.
Readers may question whether a book with a relatively small
proportion of state cases-approximately 25%-merits the state law
patina that surrounds the book's title, preface and marketing. Other
respected administrative law books9 contain a significant number of
state cases.' 0 Yet, Bonfield and Asimow uniquely emphasize state
law.
The coverage of state cases, however, does not prevent the
reader from obtaining a solid understanding of the casebook's fed-
eral law content. Any administrative law book that purports to
cover federal law (as this book does), should contain a substantial
number of seminal federal cases. Accordingly, the authors include
Supreme Court landmarks such as Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, I I
United States v. Grimaud,12 NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co. 13 and Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC.14 Additionally, an administra-
tive law book should cover the leading federal cases on constitu-
tional issues because of their importance to the study of
administrative law. Again, State and Federal Administrative Law con-
tains a number of leading constitutional cases, including Goldberg v.
Kelly,' 5 Mathews v. Eldridge,16 Londoner v. Denver 17 and Withrow v.
Larkin.a8 Moreover, where federal law dominates topics of contem-
porary relevance, an administrative law book should provide ade-
quate coverage of recent federal cases. For example, casebooks
should cover federal law such as the Freedom of Information Act.
Similarly, in the increasingly significant areas of executive and legis-
lative control over agencies, federal developments and cases domi-
9 See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: A CASEBOOK (3d ed. 1988).
10 Twenty-two of the 111 principal cases in the third edition of the Schwartz
casebook are state cases. The Schwartz book, however, does not stress state law in its
notes and lacks problems requiring consideration of the Model Act.
For a typical administrative law book employing mainly federal cases, see WALTER
GELLHORN, CLARK BYSE, PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD P. RAKOFF & Roy A. SCHOTLAND, AD-
MINISTRATrvE LAW (8th ed. 1987) (this book contains only four state decisions out of
over ninety principal cases selected).
11 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
12 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
13 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
14 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
15 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
16 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
17 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
18 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
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nate. The authors cover the important cases, including Morrison v.
Olson, 19 and Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally.20 An understand-
ing of several federal cases reveals that a grasp of federal law is pos-
sible from these materials.
Although the casebook includes significant state cases, its state
law focus emerges in the notes and problems, which contain rich
discussions of state cases and case law developments. Perhaps even
more important, the notes and problems consistently refer to state
legislation and the Model Act.
The casebook's repeated references to legislation give students
a unique perspective of administrative law. Indeed, the entire book
is more legislatively oriented than previous materials, primarily be-
cause the Model Act itself is more recent and detailed than the APA.
The APA, in contrast, is more abstract and constitutional in nature
when compared to the Model Act. Alan Morrison's thesis that "the
APA is more like a constitution than a statute" 2 1 comes alive when a
student studies the APA in relation to the Model Act's specific provi-
sions. For example, after puzzling over the absence of a provision
in the APA specifying the contents of a rulemaking record, and then
studying section 3-112 of the 1981 Model Act, which lists the multi-
part contents of a state rulemaking record,22 the student can discern
and assess differences in statutory construction and legislative pur-
poses. In this connection, the difference in the tone and texture of
these two legislative schemes provides professors with a framework
for comparative legislative inquiry unavailable in other books.
Even veteran teachers of administrative law, however, will find
it challenging to lead a fruitful discussion of the comparative differ-
ences in administrative law legislation. Like the extensive material
on rulemaking, 23 the important issues underlying these legislative
questions often are unfocused and difficult to teach. Without a co-
herent analytical framework, legislative study tends to become an
unwieldy topic that escapes a tidy set of imperatives. As Judge Pos-
ner recently noted, "it is unclear what it is that lawyers, as distinct
from political scientists or even economists, have to say about legis-
19 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
20 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
21 Morrison, supra note 1, at 253; contra Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future,
72 VA. L. REv. 447, 454-59 (1986).
22 The specific Model Act section regulating the contents of rulemaking records
includes the following major items: agency docket entries relating to the rule, any writ-
ten materials considered by the agency when formulating the proposed rule, a transcript
or tape of oral presentations made in a proceeding regarding the rule, and a copy of any
regulatory analysis of the rule. Model State APA § 3-112; A. BONFIELD & M. Asimow,
supra note 5, at 777-78.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 45-49.
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lation. ' '24 While this reviewer considered the casebook's questions
on the optimal specificity of administrative law legislation a useful
pedagogical tool, my students found the discussion difficult to com-
prehend and too policy-based. One professor's difficulty in teach-
ing this portion of the book, however, does not indicate that a
similar fate will befall others. Using this book will, in any case, pro-
voke classroom discussion on whether specific administrative law
statutes are preferable to more open-ended legislation.
Once editors decide to integrate state and federal law, the task
of selecting appropriate state materials is daunting. Editors must
confront whether it is preferable to select state cases and materials
from so-called "progressive" states (that may be at odds with the
mainstream of states), or focus on cases that are purely illustrative
or that reach novel results. Bonfield and Asimow have chosen a
pragmatic route by selecting state cases that either illustrate princi-
ples or reflect noteworthy or path-breaking developments that devi-
ate from federal law.
In an analogous sense, the choices facing an administrative law
casebook editor in selecting a mix of state and federal cases are not
unlike those of her civil procedure casebook counterpart. In civil
procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dominate the field.
Most state courts have rules systems patterned after the Federal
Rules. 25 Nonetheless, numerous states have particular rules and
caselaw that diverge from the Federal Rules. 26 Faced with the task
of imparting basic doctrine and policy to students, civil procedure
textbook authors generally have chosen to include federal decisions
interspersed with state cases to present the reader with a compari-
son. A focus on state law is especially significant whenever state
rules differ from federal law. For example, procedure texts often
include state cases involving pleadings, since some state rules re-
quire much more factual specificity than do the Federal Rules. 27
One should not, however, overstate the analogy to the writing
of a civil procedure text. In civil procedure, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are the model for most state rules. State variations
24 Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 74 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1568 (1988) (reviewing
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988)).
25 See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rule in State Courts: A Survey of
State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986).
26 E.g., OREGON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 63 (1988) (mandating
pleading of "ultimate" facts constituting a claim for relief); see RICHARD L. MARCUS, MAR-
TIN H. REDISH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 113
(1989) (New York and California "still retain features of code pleading").
27 See, e.g., R. MARCUS, M. REDISH & E. SHERMAN, supra note 26, at 114-18 (casebook
selection of a North Carolina code pleading case, Gillispie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 258
N.C. 487, 128 S.E.2d 762 (1963), to illustrate state variation in pleading requirements).
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exist, but are the exception. Moreover, states typically imitate the
detailed drafting of the Federal Rules. In the administrative law con-
text, however, the APA's broad, sweeping style, perhaps instrumen-
tal in thwarting efforts to amend it, stands in stark contrast to both
state statutes and case law. In administrative law, many state laws
are different from federal law in both result and style. State admin-
istrative law codes are vast documents that have become "extensive,
detailed, and sophisticated bodies of administrative law" 28 that do
not emulate the 1946 federal APA.
In this connection, some of the state materials in State and Fed-
eral Administrative Law deviate to such an extent from their federal
counterparts that they become models, not just points of compara-
tive departure. After reading certain state cases in Bonfield and
Asimow, students may question why the federal law has remained so
tepid. For example, Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners29
involved a state licensing agency possessing broad rulemaking
power to regulate dentists for "unprofessional conduct." The court
required the agency to adopt published rules rather than rely on
unprincipled and inconsistent ad hoc regulation by adjudication.
This decision is contrary to federal case law that has given agencies
increasing discretionary authority to select either rulemaking or ad-
judication.3o Unlike federal law, Megdal forced agencies faced with
broad legislative terminology to promulgate rules that provide no-
tice to the regulated community and, at the same time, to channel
bureaucratic energy. A reading of Megdal may prompt the student
to question the breadth of present judicial deference, under federal
law, to an agency's choice of regulation. Megdal also presents the
student with a question ofjudicial method: What is the ideal ration-
ale for mandating rules? The provocative post-Megdal note exam-
ines whether the goal of court-required rulemaking should be
accomplished via a due process holding, a form of statutory con-
struction, or a candid and activist common law of administrative
28 See Bonfield, supra note 3, at 101.
29 288 Or. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980), reprinted in A. BONFIELD & M. ASIMOW, supra
note 5, at 267.
30 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267 (1974)
(leaving to NLRB discretion whether to articulate new principles in either a rulemaking
or an adjudication); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (rejecting argument
that agency could not apply a new, general standard in an adjudication). State and Federal
Administrative Law includes the Bell Aerospace opinion, but excludes Chenery II. A. BON-
FIELD & M. AsIMow, supra note 5, at 261-64. The thorough note material after Bell Aero-
space excerpts Judge Goodwin's decision in Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982), which vacates an agency order because the
subject matter was of general applicability. This section also presents the ABA Section
of Administrative Law's resolution, which states a preference for agencies to use
rulemaking rather than adjudication for instituting proscriptions in industry-wide prac-
tices. A. BONFIELD & M. AsIMow, supra note 5, at 264-67.
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law.3 1
The authors' treatment of estoppel provides a second illustra-
tion of how an emphasis on state materials can extend beyond a
mere comparative purpose. The authors do not introduce their es-
toppel section with federal cases where courts have refused to estop
government agencies under circumstances that amount to textbook
examples of common-law estoppel.3 2 Rather, in State and Federal Ad-
ministrative Law, this section begins with a bold, well-reasoned state
opinion, Foote's Dixie Dandy, Inc. v. McHeny,33 where the court estops
a state agency because of the erroneous oral advice of an employee.
The notes following this case present conservative federal cases. 34
This presentation strengthens the authors' argument for allowing
and expanding estoppel against agencies. Moreover, the selection
of such cases presents the reader with an expanded vision of the
sources of administrative law; namely, a common law of administra-
tive law, in addition to the more familiar statutory and agency rule
sources.
II
ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION: EMPHASIZING
REAL AGENCY ACTION AND DE-EMPHASIZING
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The success of State and Federal Administrative Law will depend
upon the academic community's perception of the importance of
31 See A. BONFIELD & M. AsIMow, supra note 5, at 270-74. For a comparison of the
judiciary's review function as either a "red light" that checks agency action or a "green
light" that facilitates governmental action to enhance an agency's procedural efficiency,
see CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRAnON (1984).
32 See, e.g., Heckler v. Community Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S.
51, 60 (1984) ("[It is well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the
same terms as any other litigant."); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (refusing
to estop Social Security Administration despite bad advice not to file a written claim for
benefits); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (rejecting estoppel
argument after claimant farmer received erroneous advice that his wheat crop was insur-
able and had crop destroyed); see also Rock Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. United States, 254
U.S. 141, 143 (1920) (in refusing to permit estoppel claim, Justice Holmes reasons
"[m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the Government."); Rider v.
United States Postal Service, 862 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to allow estoppel
despite erroneous advice by postal service employee), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2430 (1989).
33 270 Ark. 816, 607 S.W.2d 323 (1980), reprinted in A. BONFIELD & M. AsIMow,
supra note 5, at 237.
34 The notes following Foote's Dixie Dandy present the policy issues for and against
estoppel against government and make good use of an excerpt from Professor Asimow's
writing. See A. BONFIELD & M. AsIMow, supra note 5, at 240-43 (quoting MICHAEL
AsIMow, ADVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 60 (1973))
(noting that the existing practice at most agencies is to "consider themselves bound by
erroneous advice" and reasoning that "[it no longer seems credible that the govern-
ment will be ruined by a judicious application of estoppel").
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state administrative law. Readers should note, however, that this
new book does not have a one-dimensional "state" focus. The or-
ganization of the book and the authors' choice of contents provide
fresh insights into the present state of administrative law.
Bonfield and Asimow divide their relatively short casebook-a
mere 741 pages of text-into three distinct organizational units.
Part I, "Agency Procedures," comprises over one-half of the book.35
This segment covers agency adjudicatory procedures and rulemak-
ing. Part II, "Nonjudicial Control of Agency Action," focuses on
the increasingly important role of the legislative and executive
branches in controlling agency action.3 6 The remainder of the
book, Part III, "Judicial Review," discusses the role of the courts in
administrative law.3 7
This division of material and the comparatively lean treatment
of judicial review makes a timely and realistic statement: The core
of administrative law is found in the internal, everyday workings and
political oversight of the modern agency, rather than in the rela-
tively rare cases that wind their expensive way to the court system.
Thus, the primary setting of State and Federal Administrative Law is the
administrative agency, not the courts. The authors' placement of
judicial review at the end of the book and their restriction of its dis-
cussion to relatively few pages mirrors a reality. Since litigants ap-
peal only a small percentage of administrative agency actions,
agency activities are of central importance to a course in administra-
tive law. Other scholars have emphasized that the agency, rather
than the court, is the appropriate "setting" for an administrative law
course.,38 State and Federal Administrative Law echoes this idea
throughout a traditional casebook format.
This orientation does not imply that State and Federal Administra-
tive Law excludes either administrative law theory or judicial review.
The book devotes considerable resources to encouraging students
to draw upon theoretical concepts in deciding the appropriate regu-
latory strategy for particular situations. Bonfield and Asimow pro-
voke students to assess whether rulemaking or adjudication is more
sensible in a given context.
Similarly, by probing the true meaning of "administrative dis-
35 A. BONFIELD & M. AsIMow, supra note 5, at 22-418.
36 Id. at 419-560.
37 Id at 561-741.
8 See, e.g., C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 31 (emphasizing work within the
agency as the primary and preferred source of administrative law norms); ROBERT L.
RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1979) (emphasizing the func-
tions of agencies); Robert L. Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A Discipline in Search
of an Organizing Principle, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 120 (1977) (tracing shift in administrative law
away from judicial review toward substantive policies underlying agency work).
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cretion," the casebook gives teachers an opportunity to educate stu-
dents in a practical lesson in legal philosophy. This term should be
distinguished from the crude and inartful "scope of review" stan-
dard under the APA.39 Administrative discretion is a concept that is
central to understanding the practical, everyday workings of an
agency. As Professor Davis taught, bureaucrats regularly deal with
requests from regulated parties for an exception to a seemingly ap-
plicable agency rule.40 Under these circumstances, the agency is
faced with a crucial question: Should it exercise its discretion to ig-
nore the rule and craft a customized solution or, conversely, should
it apply the rule to what may be a recurring problem?
Agency personnel often appreciate the easy application of rules
and their seeming appearance of evenhanded treatment. Agency re-
fusal to exercise discretion can protect personnel from claims of fa-
voritism or discrimination. In this context, refusal to exercise
discretion is seen as "fair" 4' and enables the agency to avoid the
charge of employing a hidden agenda.42 At the same time, an exer-
cise of discretion may be an effort to circumvent a published rule in
order to provide customized treatment to a unique situation. A bu-
reaucrat exercising discretion in this way may be achieving Davis'
proclaimed "discretionary justice. '43 These observations suggest
that the internal agency exercise of discretion should not be under-
stood as occurring in a vacuum or black hole of "no law." In fact,
Professor Dworkin's vision of discretion as being surrounded by a
"doughnut" or "belt" of norms limiting the freedom to act typifies a
"discretionary" act or decision.44
39 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988) (permitting a court to overturn agency "action, find-
ings, and conclusions" on undefined "abuse of discretion" grounds).
40 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 17 (1969) ("No government
has ever been a government of laws and not of men in the sense of eliminating all discre-
tionary power."); see also DENISJAMES GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS (1986); Roscoe
Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problems of the Individual Special Case, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 925 (1960).
41 See D. GALLIGAN, supra note 40, at 160-61 (noting that fairness concerns are
"based on the risk of unequal treatment" in discretionary actions).
42 See P.S. ATYAH, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial
Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1271 (1980) (increasing use of discretion
conceals the values of the decisionmaker).
43 See K. DAvIs, supra note 40, at 9-17 (identifying costs of inconsistent and extra-
legal agency discretionary acts, but emphasizing that discretion has the virtue of facilitat-
ing tailor-made rules that fit the parties and facts presented).
44 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977) ("Discretion, like the
hole in the doughnut does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of
restriction."); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 31 (1967)
(criticizing the view that the absence of a clear rule vests unlimited judicial discretion to
make "a fresh piece of legislation"). Galligan defines discretionary decisions as those
made "in the absence of that pattern of normative standards and principles." D. GALLI-
GAN, supra note 40, at 1. Barak defines discretion as the power "to choose between two
or more alternatives, when each of the alternatives is lawful." AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL
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Part I's discussion of agency procedures devotes substantial at-
tention to rulemaking. The thorough chapter on rulemaking
("Chapter 6. Rulemaking Procedures") 45 is at the heart of this sec-
tion. Further, Chapter 6 follows a related short chapter ("Chapter
5. The Relationship Between Rulemaking and Adjudication") on
the different characteristics of rulemaking and adjudication. 46
These materials stress the advantages of rulemaking over adjudica-
tion. The authors depict rulemaking as fair because it affects like
parties similarly. Budgetary pressures that have reduced or frozen
federal and state agency staffs have made rulemaking preferable to
adjudication on a cost basis: Legislative rulemaking usually pro-
vides more regulatory results. Bonfield and Asimow offer readers
an up-to-date rationale for employing increasing regulation by
rulemaking and, in so doing, lay a foundation for their detailed
treatment of rulemaking case law and legislation in Chapter 6.
Chapter 6's lengthy and detailed coverage of rulemaking is re-
markable. Professors who want their students to understand con-
temporary administrative law within the setting of a modem,
budget-strapped agency will find Chapter 6 quite valuable. Unlike
any existing book, the rulemaking chapter stresses the major ex-
emptions from public participation and publication in the rulemak-
ing procedures. In addition to including materials on the "good
cause" exemption to the APA and Model Acts, State and Federal Ad-
ministrative Law covers the so-called "categorical exemptions" in-
cluding "proprietary matters," 47 "procedural rules," 48 "interpretive
rules" and "general statements of policy." 49 Although some might
criticize the inclusion of these arguably mundane materials, the ex-
emptions discussion gives students a sense of the practical policy
choices that agencies face. A byproduct of this coverage may be to
provoke criticism of the multiple and broad exemptions to the few
safeguards associated with rulemaking.
The repeated reference to the theory of a common law of ad-
DIscRMoN 7 (1989). Professor Davis criticized the view that courts must refuse to re-
view agency decisions where there is "no law to apply" by suggesting that courts should
use judicial discretion to review agency decisions for "abuse of discretion." See Kenneth
Gulp Davis, No Law To Apply, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1 (1988).
45 A. BONFIELD & M. AsiMow, supra note 5, at 282.
46 Id. at 244.
47 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1988) (exempting from section 553 notice and com-
ment rulemaking procedures matters relating to "public property, loans, grants, bene-
fits, or contracts").
48 Id § 553(b)(3)(A) (1988) (exempting from section 553(b) procedures "rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice" except when notice or hearing is required
by statute).
49 Id. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1988) (also exempting from section 553(b) procedures "in-
terpretative rules" and "general statements of policy" except when notice or hearing is
required by statute).
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ministrative law is a paradoxical feature of Bonfield and Asimow's
text. At various points in their notes, the authors refer to the con-
cept of administrative common law. In particular, they summarize
Professor Davis's view that section 559 of the APA intentionally
bootstrapped judicial administrative common law by Congress' dec-
laration that the APA would not" 'limit or repeal additional require-
ments imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law.' "50 The
explicit reference to administrative common law may seem inappro-
priate in a book that downplays judicial review. Nonetheless, an ad-
ministrative common-law emphasis furthers the opportunity for
jurisprudential discussions in an administrative law course.
An administrative law course also provides a natural opportu-
nity for debating the appropriate roles of the respective branches of
government. The authors recognize this and structure their mate-
rial accordingly. Delegation and separation of powers materials, for
example, facilitate discussion of the positions of the court, the exec-
utive, and the legislature in relation to the agency. Similarly, the
juxtaposition of court-made administrative common law against leg-
islation, such as the Model Act of APA, provides a framework from
which to probe the ideal roles of the courts. In addition, the chapter
on legislative and executive control of agencies sets up opportuni-
ties to compare discretionary judicial control of agencies with more
specific and politically accountable control by the "political"
branches of government.5' The authors offer bold state cases that
reject the delegation of legislative power,5 2 as well as state decisions
that uphold delegation. 53 Bonfield and Asimow also present mate-
rial on state executive veto and executive branch review of rules for
purposes of comparison with Executive Order 12,291.54
While satisfying to this reviewer, the straightforward, rule-ori-
ented treatment of the scope of judicial review in State and Adminis-
trative Law may not please everyone. Bonfield and Asimow present
50 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion,
1980 UTAH L. REV. 3, 10 (quoting section 12 of the original APA, enacted in 1946)
(quoted and discussed in A. BONFIELD & M. AsiMow, supra note 5, at 316) (emphasis
added).
51 See A. BONFIELD & M. AsIMow, supra note 5, at 420 (Chapter 7. "Control of
Agencies By The Political Branches of Government").
52 See id. at 451-54 (featuring Thygesen v. Callahan, 74 Ill. 2d 404, 385 N.E.2d 699
(1979) (decision striking down a delegation of power despite the presence of procedural
safeguards and apparent standards)).
53 See id. at 454-55 (featuring Warren v. Marion County, 222 Or. 307, 353 P.2d 257
(1960) (upholding a delegation due, in part, to presence of appeal procedures).
54 Id. at 502-08 (describing section 3-202 of the Model Act, which allows a Gover-
nor to rescind or suspend a rule or rulemaking if the agency possesses a like power, and
explaining the California Office of Administrative Law's ability to veto and rescind rules
by probing some of the many questions regarding Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127
(1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601, at 473 (1988)).
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the essential materials on scope of review by employing a logical
doctrinal organization. After starting with judicial review of agency
factfindings, the authors include sections on legal interpretation, ap-
plication of law to facts and, finally, judicial review under the highly
discretionary arbitrary and capricious standard.55 The authors high-
light doctrinal considerations throughout this chapter. Although
Bonfield and Asimow show sensitivity to the amorphous nature of
scope of review norms,56 this chapter conspicuously lacks any note
discussion of the academic debates regarding the proper role for
courts in reviewing agency action under various statutory regimes. 57
The doctrinal emphasis on administrative procedure in this
chapter tends to ignore the substantive law that activates agency ac-
tion, the subject ofjudicial review. For example, the authors wisely
present Motor Vehiclea Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. 5s as one of two principal cases illustrating an
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review.59 They omit, how-
ever, subsequent note reference to the recurrent and fascinating
problem of judicial review of agency deregulatory action.60 Cases
such as State Farm should be launching pads for discussion of the
appropriate judicial role in differing substantive regulatory settings,
each setting having unique and increasingly complex legislative his-
tories. Teachers using this book will need to rely on secondary
readings that discuss these contemporary dynamics affecting judicial
review.
III
NrTPICKS AND KUDOS
While State and Federal Administrative Law is generally well writ-
55 BONFIELD & AsImow, supra note 5, at 562-627.
56 See, e.g., id. at 562-63 (authors list formulas for review of agency factfinding and
then ask readers: "isn't a reviewing court likely to reverse agency fact findings which it
strongly believes are wrong regardless of what formula is employed?").
57 Compare Colin Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 549 (1985) (preferring executive branch legislative interpretation due to econo-
mies of uniform, consistent and low cost construction) and Frank Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (advocating judicial respect of partisan legisla-
tion demanded by interest groups) with Linda R. Hirshman, PostmodernJurisprudence and
the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 646, 671 (1988) (stressing judicial
branch advantages such as the "non-majoritarian characteristics of independence and
life tenure" and judicial "training and experience") and Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 74-75 (1985) (advocating "hard look" judicial
review in selective contexts).
58 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
59 A. BONFIELD & M. ASiMOW, supra note 5, at 607.
60 See generally Hirshman, supra note 57, at 676-703 (defending recent Supreme
Court arbitrary and capricious review decisions as consistent with proper judicial role
and public choice theory); Cass Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983
Sup. CT. REV. 177 (1984).
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ten, there are a few items meriting attention for prospective users.
Although one could construe the following paragraphs as criticism,
the authors' choices usually are reasonable and defensible.
First, some users will find the principal case selections overly
edited. The authors have severely reduced the length of many deci-
sions by replacing the bulk of factual material with terse editorial
statements of facts and by omitting chunks of the legal rationale
within the opinions. Bonfield and Asimow succeed in satisfying
their goal of producing a lean casebook. This achievement, how-
ever, comes at the expense of incompleteness-numerous cases
possess only a portion of valuable factual information. 61 Of course,
teachers who use this book can add supplemental material. They
may find it difficult, however, to supply the cogent facts that provide
real-life interest to case discussion. Moreover, the time used to de-
termine whether the facts should be supplemented carries an oppor-
tunity cost.
A related, yet distinct, point concerns the comprehensive
problems that the authors pose throughout State and Federal Adminis-
trative Law. In addition to being well-drafted, the problems raise
significant issues and policies, and emphasize appropriate points
made by the cases, notes and legislation. 62 Many of these problems
call for a "three-tier" discussion involving the APA, the Model Act
61 To illustrate, in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), readers might better un-
derstand the court-imposed "administrative segregation" if the authors supplied more
facts rather than the bland prison "uprising" in which "several guards were injured." A.
BONFIELD & M. AsIMow, supra note 5, at 47, 77. In fact, inmates attacked prison guards
with table legs, flashlights and barbells; one guard reported a broken jaw and teeth,
while another "received a broken nose, and another a broken thumb .... Violence
erupted into a riot during which[ ] a group of prisoners attempted to seize the institu-
tions 'control center.'" Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 463.
Bonfield & Asimow's editing of the non-factual portions of decisions also is occa-
sionally frustrating. For example, the editing of United States v. Florida East Coast Ry.
Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), omits "shall" language from legislation mandating the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to consider various factors. A. BONFIELD & M. AsiMow,
supra note 5, at 307; see 410 U.S. at 225-26 n.1 (quoting section 1(14)(a) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (1970)). These words seem important to Justice
Rehnquist's statutory construction style of analysis. In the same case, the authors also
probably omit the most important and questionable sentence of the opinion in which
Justice Rehnquist suggests that the terms "'on the record' and 'after... hearing' used
in § 553 were not words of art, and that other statutory language having the same mean-
ing could trigger the provisions of §§ 556 and 557 in rulemaking proceedings." Id. at
238. This critical sentence reveals the Court's flexibility about the words that can trig-
ger protections under section 553(c) of the APA. At the same time, the Court seems to
ignore the mandatory "shall" language used in section 1 (14)(a) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act. Students who use Bonfield and Asimow's version of Forida East Coast, there-
fore, cannot readily grasp the significance of the case and its inflexibility regarding
triggering words needed to call for formal rulemaking.
62 For succinct and thoughtful discussions of the virtues of the problem method,
see David F. Cavers, In Advocacy of the Problem Method, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 449 (1943);
Kenneth CuIp Davis, The Text-Problem Form of the Case Method as a Means of Mind Training
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or the Constitution, and administrative common law. In order to
cover the APA and the Model Act, the authors include short
problems raising fewer factual and regulatory policy issues. Nearly
every problem ends with a "See" reference to a related case or, oc-
casionally, an article. Some of the case references represent deci-
sions with a similar factual base. These decisions, however, do not
necessarily provide optimal legal solutions to the problems
presented.
Some users may find these problems too unrealistic. A compet-
ing textbook contains problems that are much longer and more fac-
tually complex.63 One commentator concluded that "lengthy
problem statements accurately reflect the complexity of administra-
tive law problems, especially when federal regulatory issues are in-
cluded, so that many of the problem statements would be
misleading and unrealistic if they were boiled down to a one-page
statement." 64 Yet, shorter problems are consistent with the au-
thors' desire for a casebook of manageable length. Moreover, by
keeping their problems factually simple, Bonfield and Asmiow redi-
rect the students' energies toward solutions of multi-issue legal
questions generally involving both the Model Act and the A.P.A.
Additional facts may well have made these problems unworkable.
The brevity of the problems, however, may lull students and profes-
sors into believing that their analysis can be correspondingly brief.
Some of the more complex problems, on the contrary, merit lengthy
classroom discussions. Professors will welcome the painstakingly
thorough discussions of the problems in the detailed Teacher's
Manual accompanying the casebook.65
for Advanced Law Students, 12 J. LEGAL EDUC. 543 (1960); Quintin Johnstone, Student Dis-
content and Educational Reform in the Law Schools, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 255, 264-70 (1971).
63 See PETER L. STRAUSS & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROBLEMS (1983),
for use with WALTER GELLHORN, CLARK BYSE & PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTS (7th ed. 1979).
64 Gregory L. Ogden, The Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 654,
667 (1984). Ogden defends longer administrative law problems by reasoning that the
multi-issue nature of the course requires problems of sufficient length. He states that
administrative law casebooks and problems necessarily raise "a variety of common law,
constitutional, statutory, regulation, and policy issues that are not easily pigeonholed."
Id. (footnote omitted).
65 One problem covering the unavoidable relationship between ex parte contacts
and the need for a decision on an exclusive record exemplifies how Bonfield and
Asimow present brief, yet demanding, three-tier problems. Following Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Org. (PATCO) v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), Bonfield and Asimow pose the problem of a locally elected mountain board
of supervisors hearing a petition to rezone rural land adjacent to a park for residential
use. A. BONFIELD & M. AsIMow, supra note 5, at 174-75. As was true with the main
PATCO case, the applicant, Martha, is a friend of one of the supervisors, Sarah. Martha
asks Sarah to dinner and explains the need for rezoning. Later, Martha's land pur-
chaser, a developing company, contributes to Sarah's reelection campaign. Students are
1990]
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Another nitpick pertains to Chapter 8, "Freedom of Informa-
tion and Other Open Government Laws." 6 6 This relatively short,
twenty-six page chapter focuses on the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"). Like most administrative law casebooks, the limited
-space devoted to this topic barely scratches the surface of a huge
and unwieldy statutory scheme.6 7 The authors' treatment here is
too sketchy and out of character with the "hands-on" approach of
the rest of the book. Following the high quality textual material that
outlines the basics of the FOIA, the casebook offers only two cases
on FOIA exemptions, NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 68 and Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown. 69 These materials convey a sense of the FOIA's tech-
nical constructions, but fail to do much more than that. In fact, the
cases cover only two of the nine FOIA exemptions. Like many other
administrative law materials, the authors' decision to ignore large
pieces of FOIA reflects the inherent unmanageability of the topic. It
is particularly surprising that the authors of State and Federal Adminis-
trative Law opt for in-depth coverage of exemptions from notice and
comment rulemaking, yet skim over most of the FOIA exemptions.
State and Federal Administrative Law also contains material on nu-
merous issues largely ignored by its competitor casebooks. In addi-
tion to including state materials, its detailed coverage of
rulemaking, and its discussion of rulemaking exceptions, the
casebook covers other subjects that are not ordinarily emphasized.
Specifically, the authors wisely include a section on the resjudicata
impact of administrative adjudications. 70 Questions of claim and is-
asked if a petition to rezone, in which Supervisor Sarah is participating, can be set aside
by a reviewing court. Since the Model Act does not apply to local decisions of this na-
ture, the problem presents a constitutional due process issue. Students consider
whether procedural due process can apply to the discretionary legal standards involved
in rezoning. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). The authors then suggest
analysis under section 4-213 of the 1981 Model Act, which calls for disclosure of pre-
hearing contacts, and analysis under section 557(d) of the APA. The problem presents
the dilemma of whether a rule prohibiting e parte contacts with members of an elected
board who must decide a hot political issue of great local significance is pragmatically
feasible.
66 A. BONFIELD & M. AsIMow, supra note 5, at 536.
67 For an exception to the usually brief treatment of the FOIA, see W. GELLHORN,
C. BYSE, P. STRAuss, T. RAKOFF & R. SCHOTLAND, supra note 10 (richly footnoted but
relatively succinct 51-page casebook coverage of FOIA).
68 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
69 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
70 A. BONFIELD & M. AsIMow, supra note 5, at 227-34. This section's crisp case and
note materials present University of Tennessee v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788 (1986) (giving
preclusive impact to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim but refusing to allow preclusion on a
companion claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act), and raise the related
policy issue of agency non-acquiescence, the practice of an agency intentionally ignoring
existing law. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by FederalAdmin-
istrative Agencies, 98 YALE LJ. 679 (1989); Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw
Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 V.ND. L. REV. 471 (1986); Joshua I.
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sue preclusion increasingly arise in court suits following administra-
tive adjudications. 71 Further, the authors cover a related set of
materials that address whether courts should require agencies to be
consistent. 72
Conversely, State and Federal Administrative Law devotes scant at-
tention to the current development of alternate dispute resolution
("ADR") in administrative agencies. True, the authors give readers
useful materials on regulatory negotiation, the creative process that
allows affected interest groups to negotiate rules. 73 Nevertheless,
rather than highlighting agency ADR as a distinct section in the text,
the authors place this material within the section on initiating
rulemaking proceedings. 74 Similarly, the authors' organizational
choice apparently led them to omit references to equally important
developments in mediation and arbitration of agency adjudicatory
disputes. The 1980s witnessed a dramatic surge in interest regard-
ing agency experimentation with ADR. 75 Indeed, some agencies
Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. LJ.
1815 (1989).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (refusing to apply non-
mutual issue preclusion to prevent litigation of an issue of law); Zanghi v. Incorporated
Village of Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying issue preclusion to bar
false arrest case following earlier agency determination that a defendant-village em-
ployee had reasonable grounds to arrest); Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.)
(allowing preclusion and distinguishing Mendoza), cert. granted andjudg. vacated 469 U.S.
1082 (1984); Losey v. Roberts, 677 F. Supp. 101 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying preclusion
after earlier unemployment compensation adjudication to bar a later claim for unem-
ployment benefits); Langdon v. WEN Management Co., 537 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div.
1989) (applying issue preclusion to bar civil case following earlier workers' compensa-
tion determination); A. Leo Leven & Susan M. Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United
States Government, 70 IowA L. REV. 113 (1984) (critical of systematic relitigation by
government).
72 A. BONFIELD & M. AsIMow, supra note 5, at 234-37 (presenting International
Union, United Auto. Workers of America v. NLRB, 802 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1986), where
Judge Posner allows the NLRB to ignore existing precedents only if it provided an ex-
planation for an apparent inconsistency). The consistency issue looms large within the
Internal Revenue Service. See Deborah Geier, The Emasculated Role ofJudicial Precedent in
the Tax Court and the Internal Revenue Service, 39 OKLA. L. REv. 427 (1986); Lawrence
Zelenak, Should Courts Require the IRS to Be Consistent?, 40 TAx L. REV. 411 (1985).
73 A. BONFIELD & M. ASIMOW, supra note 5, at 286-91 (summarizing 1985 Adminis-
trative Conference Recommendation on regulatory negotiation, Procedures for Negotiating
Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1988), and then providing readers with contra-
dictory views for and against regulatory negotiation in excerpts from Henry H. Perritt,
Negotiated Rulemaking and Administrative Law, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 471 (1986) (stressing pos-
itive features of negotiated rulemaking) and William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes:
Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 EwvTL. L. 55
(1987) (observing that regulatory negotiation can obscure and even pervert the public
interest)).
74 A. BONFIELD & M. AsIMow, supra note 5, at 286 (presenting regulatory negotia-
tion materials in part of a section entitled "Initiating Rulemaking Proceedings" and
within a subsection labeled "Formulation of Proposed Rules").
75 See, e.g., Savage v. CIA, 826 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1987) (Judge Posner's recommen-
dation that disputes centering on fee waivers under FOIA be subject to binding arbitra-
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looked to ADR as a means of reducing serious backlogs in adjudica-
tions.76 During this period, a corresponding increase in criticism of
agency ADR arose. 77 In the rush to settle adjudications, agencies
may bargain away the public values that underlie specific statutory
schemes. 78 Thus, agency mediations can produce results at odds
with legislative intent. Moreover, these mediation results may
thwart the significant guidance function of published substantive
laws that require regulated firms to obey dear and consistently pros-
ecuted norms.79 It seems paradoxical that the latest casebook in the
tion); ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE: U.S. SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF
ALTERNATE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 701-860 (1987) (listing and describing in-
creasing agency use of ADR); Administrative Conference Recommendation 86-3:1
C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1988) (recommendation that federal agencies adopt ADR methods);
GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES (1986) (studying 161 cases of ADR
environmental conflicts and encouraging greater usage to improve the quality of dispute
resolution); Phillip J. Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Procedures and the
Administrative Process, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 141 (1987) (urging expanded use of alternative dis-
pute resolution in administrative agencies); Richard Mays, Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Environmental Enforcement: A Noble Experiment or a Lost Cause?, 18 ENvrL. L. REP.
10,098 (1988) (cataloging and lauding EPA efforts to employ ADR techniques).
76 See Mays, supra note 75 (expressing need to reduce EPA backlog by use of ADR
techniques).
77 See, e.g., Harold Bruff, Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbi-
tration in Federal Programs, 67 TEX. L. REV. 441 (1989) (raising constitutional problems
with various federal arbitral programs and offering suggested restructuring to minimize
these problems); Edward Brunet, The Costs of Environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution,
18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,515 (1988) (showing how compromise adjudication results are in-
consistent with substantive law); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea
or Anathema, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 671-72 (1986) (criticizing governmental encourage-
ment of compromises when public interest issues are involved); David Shoenbrod, Limits
and Dangers of Environmental Mediation: A Review Essay, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1453 (1983)
(questioning results reached by mediation of environmental conflict).
78 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 77; Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073,
1075 (1984) ("[Slettlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should
be neither encouraged nor praised."); F.A. Mann, Private Arbitration and Public Policy, 4
Civ. JUST. Q. 257, 267 (1985) (demanding that private arbitral awards be reviewed by
courts, "not only to develop the law, but also to ensure the administration ofjustice and
thus to avoid the risk of arbitrariness"); Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights
Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 0Ino ST. J. Dis. RES. 157 (1989)
(critical of results reached by arbitration where clear statutory mandates exist).
79 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 49-51, 63-65 (2d ed. 1969) (em-
phasizing the legal system's need to inform "the affected party [of] the rules he is ex-
pected to observe," describing this process as a need for "education" about law, and
stressing clarity in legal regulation as "one of the most essential ingredients of legal-
ity"); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV.
1, 55 (1987) (outcomes reached by mediation and arbitration may ignore substantive law
and undercut the "crucial guidance function of positive law"). In short, an agency pro-
gram of mediating compromise can lead to results that are different from published
sanctions. Over time, these results may diminish the essential self-policing characteristic
of law that is essential to the resource-short modern administrative agency. ADR, "like
plea bargaining, ... elevates dispute termination above compliance with the purpose-
fully crafted standards that constitute positive law." Brunet, supra, at 24. For an analo-
gous criticism of criminal plea bargaining, see Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the
Criminal Defendants Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L.
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ADR field contains a comprehensive discussion of administrative
agency ADR,8 0 while the newest administrative law casebook de-
votes only minimal attention to this controversial but growing
development.
CONCLUSION
Administrative law should benefit from State and Federal Adminis-
trative Law's shift in thinking. That state statutes, rules and case law
can be an important source of innovation in this field makes intuitive
sense. The casebook's emphasis on legislative solutions based on
the Model Act gives this body of law a different tone-the legislature
and the agency, not the courts, dominate. Similarly, the focus on
agency action through rulemaking and agency adjudication, and the
correspondingly brief treatment ofjudicial review, reflect a recogni-
tion that the primary source of administrative law should be outside
the court system. These themes characterize Bonfield and Asimow's
book and present a unique treatment of a core curriculum course
that is still seeking its identity.
REv. 931, 933-34 (1983) ("[P]lea bargaining perverts both the initial prosecutorial for-
mulation of criminal charges" and has undercut the goals of legal doctrines").
80 See JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT RAU & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, PROCESSES OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 688-701 (1989) (highlighting agency dis-
pute resolution and emphasizing alternatives to the traditional adjudication model).
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